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ABSTRACT: We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree 
of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the 
influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database 
including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish 
municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a 
local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre-
hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one 
analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We 
measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent 
government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by 
parties represented in local government when standing at the first national 
legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the 
number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative 
elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed 
reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found 
to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and 
homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left. 
Keywords: H7, Q15, R52 
JEL Codes: land use regulations, urban growth controls, political economy 
RESUM: El treball analitza si l’oferta de sòl a nivell local està influenciada pel 
grau de competència política en el municipis. Els resultats s’interpreten com un 
indicatiu de la influència dels lobbies en l’evolució d’aquesta oferta. S’utilitza 
una base de dades nova que inclou dades politiques i d’oferta de sòl per més de 
2,000 municipis espanyols pel període 2003-2007. A Espanya, les polítiques 
d'ús del sòl són en gran part una responsabilitat local de manera que els 
municipis han d’aprovar periòdicament els plans urbanístics que delimiten els 
usos del sòl. La variable política principal d’aquests plans i la que s’analitza en 
aquest treball és el volum de sòl urbanitzable. Es mesura la competència 
política local com el marge de victòria del govern municipal actual. Aquesta 
variable s’instrumenta utilitzant el número de vots que van obtenir els partits 
representats en el govern local a les primeres eleccions legislatives nacionals 
posteriors al restabliment de la democràcia així com el nombre de vots 
obtinguts per aquests partits a nivell regional a les eleccions estatals. Els 
resultats indiquen que la competència política redueix la quantitat de nou sòl 
urbanitzable. Aquest efecte és més intens als suburbis, a les ciutats amb un 
percentatge alt de commuters i propietaris d’habitatge i en els municipis 
governats per partits d’esquerra. 
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1. Introduction 
The steeply rising housing prices witnessed during the last decade were mainly attributable to 
demand pressures (e.g., low interest rates, population growth), some of which were common 
to many places. However, the extent to which one such demand shock translates into a price 
increase would appear to be mediated by the housing supply (Glaeser and Ward, 2006). In 
turn, recent research clearly indicates that land supply is the main determinant of housing 
supply, and that as well as being influenced by geographical constraints (e.g. topography, see 
Saiz, 2010) the former can also be affected by land use regulations. Urban growth boundaries 
restrict the amount of land available for development and, more generally, zoning ordinances 
limit the amount of land for specific uses, and the implementation of these regulations 
imposes different kinds of costs on developers. A growing body of empirical research shows 
that these land use regulations account for a sizeable proportion of housing prices (Glaeser et 
al., 2005a), a finding that is equally true of urban growth boundaries (Hannah et al. 1993), 
which is the regulation that most resembles those examined in our case study. 
One limitation of these attempts to evaluate the impact of land use regulations is that 
they usually fail to take into account problems of endogeneity. The difficulty faced in 
tackling this, however, is that there is very little information available on how land use 
regulation decisions are taken. To overcome this would require identifying the institutions 
that actually make these decisions and the main actors controlling the process. The classical 
view sees homeowners as key players in the political process. The fact that in many areas of 
the U.S. the median voter is a homeowner, and homeowners supposedly oppose growth, 
would account for the restrictions placed on land supply (Fischel, 1985). Yet, the empirical 
evidence in favor of this hypothesis is scarce (Dhering et al., 2008; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 
2009), leading a number of authors to examine another “suspect” that might be capable of 
influencing the political process, namely owners of undeveloped land and/or developers. 
Both Glaeser et al. (2005b) and Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2009) believe them to form an 
organized lobby, prepared to offer bribes to local politicians in exchange either for a building 
license (the first paper) or for a more general reduction in regulatory stringency (the second)1. 
However, in both papers, residents are also considered as having a role to play in lobbying 
governments (seeking greater regulation), with the implicit assumption that they are able to 
organize themselves despite the great numbers involved. Glaeser et al. (2005b) justify their 
assumption by providing evidence of the increasing cohesion of green and anti-growth 
coalitions in the U.S. over the last few decades. While this should not be disregarded, here we 
                                                 
1 See also the classical work by Molotch (1976), for a discussion of the various groups that might have a stake 
on a city’s growth policy. There are a few other papers that analyze land use regulations from a political 
economy perspective but that do not address the role of developers lobbies directly (see, e.g., Calabrese et al., 
2007, and Ortalo-Magne and Prat, 2007). 
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focus directly on the main instrument resident voters have for influencing the regulatory 
decisions taken by local governments, namely their capacity to throw the incumbent out of 
office if he or she provides regulations that do not coincide with their own. We believe that 
this approach offers considerable potential for explaining differences in regulatory intensity 
across jurisdictions, especially in Spain (our case study), where land use regulations are the 
responsibility of local governments, which operate as small parliamentary democracies, with 
many additional responsibilities aside from regulating land use, and where the procedures for 
formulating and (especially) implementing land policies do not come under close voter 
scrutiny. In such a situation, the degree of political competition (measured, as is the case 
elsewhere, by an incumbent’s margin of victory) determines the extent to which a politician 
is able to pass the regulation sought by the developers or is forced to respond to voters’ 
interests.  
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to determine whether the degree of political 
competition has a bearing on local land supply. To do so, we develop a simple theoretical 
model in which local politicians choose the amount of land for development (i.e. the local 
growth boundary) so as to ensure their own re-election and to raise revenue from the bribes 
paid by the lobby of land developers. Our modeling strategy follows the Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) lobbying model, as adopted also by Hilbert and Robert-Nicoud (2009), but 
simplified so as to allow for the inclusion of only one lobby (that of the land developers). 
This model has been used elsewhere to analyze policy decisions, albeit in other settings (e.g. 
Fredriksson, 1997, and Damania et al., 2003), and also to study the effect of political 
competition on lobbying intensity and policy setting (Wilson and Damania, 2005). The paper 
is also related to the more general literature on the impact of political competition on 
accountability and rent extraction (e.g. Besley and Case, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). 
Empirical papers estimating the impact of political competition on a range of policy variables 
include Case (2001), Johansson (2003), Solé-Ollé (2006), Besley et al. (2006), Svaleryd and 
Vlachos (2009) and Fiva (2009). 
Our model predicts that stiff political competition leads to a reduction in the amount of 
new land made available for development by a local government. We test this hypothesis 
with a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 
Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. Indeed, Spain constitutes a good testing 
ground for our hypothesis, as land use policies are basically a local responsibility, with 
municipalities having periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans. The main policy 
variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for 
potential development. Furthermore, during this period, land development and land supply 
increased greatly in Spain (European Environmental Agency, 2006; Ministerio de Fomento, 
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2006), at times despite public opinion, reflecting real concerns that local governments are 
overly influenced by the interests of land developers (Martin Mateo, 2007; Fundación 
Alternativas, 2007). 
Very few papers, it should be stressed, seek to offer empirical explanations as to how 
land use regulations are enacted, and the evidence remains somewhat limited. Most undertake 
interregional analyses (Carruthers, 2003; Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002; Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud, 2009; Saiz, 2010) and, as a result, encounter difficulties when matching land use 
measures to the political jurisdictions empowered with their introduction. Others draw on 
local data, but either disregard the political factors or are unable to obtain any evidence 
regarding their relevance (Bates and Santerre, 1994 and 2001; Evenson and Wheaton, 2003). 
Often the problem is that the papers employ a regulatory index that is available for a single 
cross-section of towns, which makes it difficult to determine which specific (past) 
government was responsible for a particular policy. By contrast, the policy variable adopted 
here - the amount of new land assigned for potential development during a term-of-office - 
can easily be matched to the local government that took the decision (and, therefore, with its 
political traits, e.g. the level of political competition it faced at that time). 
Our identification strategy relies on the use of instruments for the vote margin. Our first 
instrument is constructed using the number of votes obtained by the current incumbent 
party/parties at a given election sometime in the past (i.e. the first national legislative 
elections following the re-establishment of democracy, held in Spain in 1977). The second 
instrument is constructed using the actual number of votes obtained by the party/parties at the 
regional level in the closest national legislative elections. Our results indicate that stiffer 
political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land assigned for development, 
and that this effect is quantitatively meaningful. The effect was found to be most marked in 
suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities 
governed by the left. On the basis of these findings we conclude that different actors have 
varying degrees of influence on local regulations: developers acquire more influence when 
the political competition in a jurisdiction is low, while homeowners are more influential when 
the opposite case holds, and they have more to lose (e.g. in suburbs).  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a simple 
theoretical model from which we generate our empirical prediction. In section 3 we describe 
our empirical strategy: the estimated equation, the data and variables, and the identification 
strategy. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 6
2. Theoretical framework 
In this section we present a simple theoretical framework from which we derive an empirical 
equation that relates the degree of political competition with the main aspect of local land 
policy in which we are interested, i.e. the amount of new land that a local government puts in 
the market during a given term-of-office.  
The economic side of our model is a simplified version of the urban growth boundary 
model (see, for example,  Brueckner, 1990, 1995 & 1999), amended in a number of minor 
aspects so as to better characterize the land supply decision of towns (as opposed to those of 
the metropolitan areas) and to allow resident homeowners to influence land supply decisions 
through the ballot box. The political side of the model considers that local politicians face a 
trade-off between providing the land policies demanded by resident homeowners, who can 
throw them out of office, and taking bribes from a lobby of organized land developers. We 
follow Grossman & Helpman (1994) in modeling the lobbying game.  
Basic structure. We analyze the case of a small town whose land policies have no effect on 
any other community. We are interested in determining how the local government decides on 
how much new land should be assigned for development, while taking into account the 
interests of voters and the land developers’ lobby, and given forecasts of future demand for 
locating into the community.  
There are two periods, 0 and 1; in period 0, the local government takes a decision 
regarding how much land to put on the market for period 1, on the basis of the amount of land 
assigned for development but remaining vacant in period 0 and the expected demand in 
period 1. In period 0, each town is occupied solely by immobile homeowners, who are, 
therefore, the only group allowed to vote in local elections. The land area under the 
jurisdiction of the town can be classified into: (i) built-up land, occupied by homeowners’ 
houses, (ii) developable land, which is available for the building of new homes that might in 
the future be occupied by mobile renters, and (iii) land actually classified as non-developable 
but whose status could change as a result of a local government decision. We assume a 
positive amount of developable land remaining vacant in period 0; this might be due, for 
example, to the fact that past land supply decisions were based on long-horizon forecasts (see 
section 3.1 to understand why this might be the case in Spain) or to past forecasting errors (i.e. 
expected demand pressures vanishing during the bust), and not necessarily to an explicit 
decision to leave land supply unconstrained. Be that as it may, the crucial point in deciding 
whether or not to expand the supply of developable land is the increase in demand forecast 
for period 1; if this is greater than the current amount of developable land standing vacant 
then there will be pressure to expand land supply.  
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Built-up land is owned by resident homeowners while the remaining portion of land is 
owned by just a small number of agents that may or may not be residents but who, in any 
case, have a negligible (direct) impact on results at the ballot box. Their ability to influence 
policy derives from their capacity to effectively lobby local politicians. For simplicity, we 
shall refer to these agents as the ‘developer lobby’, although we do not in fact draw any 
distinction between developers and the owners of undeveloped land. Renters play no role in 
the political process, although they do influence policy-making through their impact on the 
demand for a particular location. 
Homeowners’ utility. In period 0, the town has H0 resident homeowners. They settled in the 
town at some time in the past, locating in a neighborhood where building a house was 
cheaper, and now they do not want to move to another town, because of removal costs or 
their attachment to their home, or to a different neighborhood of the same town, since it is 
assumed that a town’s amenities can be enjoyed independently of specific location. We 
assume that a homeowner consumes one unit of land, so 00 XH = , 0X  being the amount of 
built-up land in period 0.  
The expected utility of homeowners in period 1, V1, is equal to their expected private 
consumption level, E(c1), plus the utility provided by any amenities specific to a location, a, 
less a “disamenity” effect attributable to the size of the town’s population, N1, plus the utility 
provided by the amount of open land available in the community (L – 1X
~ ):  
                                           V1 = E(c1) + a – β N1  +  γ (L – 1X~ )                                               (1) 
Where L is the land area under the town’s jurisdiction and 1X
~  is the amount of land made 
available for development. Population in period 1 includes both the long-standing resident 
homeowners, 0H , and the new renting residents, 1 R . We also assume that these renters 
consume just one unit of land so 1010101 )( XXXXRHN =−+=+= . The parameter β 
measures the disutility caused by adding an additional resident to the community2. The 
parameter γ captures an additional population externality which is derived from the loss of 
open space (see Brueckner, 2000). We also assume that homeowners only own one unit of 
land (i.e. that occupied by their home), the remaining land (that made available for 
development to house renters and the land which remains undeveloped) is owned by the 
developer lobby. Given this assumption, the budget constraint of a homeowner is just E(c1)  =  
E(y1), where E(y1) is the expected income for period 1, which we consider independently of 
location. Homeowners do not appear as rent payers, rather they are treated as renters who pay 
the rent to themselves. The utility function (1) can be restated as:  
                                                 
2 This population externality is central to some growth control models found in the literature (Brueckner, 1999) 
and could be due, for example, to the effect new residents have on local budgets. 
 8
                                                             V1 = E(d1) –   1X
~δ                                                       (2) 
where E(d1)=E(y1) + (a+γL) is just the expected demand for locating in the town in period 1, 
and δ=(β+γ) is the overall population externality. And, given that both income and amenities 
are exogenous, the marginal impact of 1 X
~  on homeowners’ utility is just: 
                                                                      δ−=∂
∂  V
1
1
X~
                                                          (3) 
Developer lobby’s profits. Developers seek to maximize their profits, which are dependent on 
the number of new residents entering the community. Our assumption is that these new 
residents come from a class of mobile renters, with the same utility function as that of 
homeowners (expression 1). Renters are fully mobile and on arrival locate in neighborhoods 
not yet occupied by homeowners as these districts have the highest building costs. Full 
mobility implies that they will locate in the town only if they can obtain the utility level 
attainable elsewhere, which we set to zero for simplicity. The budget constraint of a mobile 
renter will be:  
                                                        E(y1) = E(c1) +  r1                                                             (4) 
where r1 is the rent per unit of land. By equating (1) to the prevailing utility level (i.e. to zero) 
we find the expression for E(c1), and after substitution in (4), and recalling that 11 XN = , we 
obtain the following expression for the unit land rent: 
                                                           111  )( X
~dEr δ−=                                                           (5) 
Developers will expand the community, by providing houses for the mobile renters, if 
the unit land rent in (5) is higher than the corresponding development costs, which include 
the opportunity cost of the land being put to other uses (e.g. agriculture), which we set to zero 
for simplicity, plus the construction costs per unit of land, which are assumed to rise with 
distance from the place where homeowners chose to locate in the past: 1 Xτ . According to 
Epple et al. (1988), this might be attributable to the decline in quality of terrain as the 
community expands away from the nucleus (e.g. hilly plots, lack of water resources, poor soil 
quality, and distance from main infrastructure). Developers, however, would like to develop 
the town so as to maximize profits, Π, which can be expressed as the integral of the profit 
function (i.e., rents as in expression 5 above minus the development costs) over the range of 
land owned by the ‘developer lobby’ (i.e., from 0X  to 1X
~ ):  
                                       ( ) ( )∫∫ −−=−= 1
0
1
0
d )(dΠ 11111
X~
X
X~
X
XXX~dEXXr τδτ                                (6) 
The marginal impact of 1 X
~  on the developer lobby’s profits is just: 
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                                            1101
1
)()()( X~dEXX~
X~
τδδ +−+−−=∂
Π∂                                     (7) 
This expression states that allowing for more development results in a reduction of the 
developer lobby’s profits, since this depresses the land rents of already developed or 
developable land (i.e. the term )( 01 XX
~ −−δ ), but at the same time increases their profits, 
since rents can be obtained from additional development (i.e. the term 11 )()( X
~dE τδ +− ).  
Voting. Homeowners will vote for the incumbent if the increase in utility during the term 
ΔV1=V1-V0, weighted by the probability that they are informed about the consequences of the 
policy θ, plus the average popularity of the incumbent at this election, η, is higher than their 
reservation utility level iσ . This condition can be written as: 
                                                           iσηθ     VΔ    1 ≥+                                                            (8) 
We assume that the average popularity of the incumbent party η is distributed 
uniformly on the support [-1/2ψ,1/2ψ] . The higher the value of ψ , the higher the density of 
swing voters (i.e. voters that are indifferent as to whether they support the incumbent or the 
challenger, and so who are more sensitive to the utility gain derived from policy) and the 
more competitive is the election. The reservation utility iσ  is assumed to have a zero mean 
and to be uniformly distributed on the support [-1/2,1/2]. Given these assumptions, the 
probability of the incumbent’s re-election becomes a smooth function of policy, 1X
~ , and can 
be written as: 
                                                             1 X
~p δθψλ −=                                                            (9) 
where 0V21 += /λ . Expression (9) states that the probability of the incumbent’s being re-
elected will fall as the amount of new land assigned for development increases (thus 
provoking a utility loss for resident homeowners), and that this effect will be more marked as 
the externality parameterδ  rises, the awareness among voters concerning the consequences 
of this policy, θ,  increases, and the political competition becomes stronger, as measured by 
the  ψ parameter. 
Lobbying. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that the owners of 
undeveloped land form a lobby and offer the incumbent bribes in exchange for an increase in 
the amount of developable land ( 1X
~ ), which should satisfy the following conditions: 
                                                      TpX~SX~ ρ  )(argmax 11 +=                                            (10a) 
                                        ))((  ))()((argmax  1111 TpX
~SX~SX~X~ ρ++−Π=                       (10b) 
                                                                    0Δ 1 ≥X~                                                            (10c) 
Expression (10a) states that the incumbent aims to maximize the sum of bribes obtained 
in the present plus the discounted value (ρ is the discount factor) of future exogenous rents T 
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weighted by the probability of reelection p. Expression (10b) states that the incumbent should 
also maximize the sum of the payoff of politicians and the lobby. Expression (10c) states that 
decisions regarding the amount of land assigned for development are irreversible, so 
developable land can increase from one period to the next or remain the same, but never 
decrease (see section 3.1 for an explanation of why this is the case in Spain). 
The FOC of (10a) and (10b) with respect to 1X
~  are: 
                                                           0V
V
)(
1
1
11
1 =∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂
X~
pT
X~
X~S ρ                                         (11a) 
                                          0V
V
)()()(
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
1 =∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂−∂
Π∂
X~
pT
X~
X~S
X~
X~S
X~
X~ ρ                        (11b) 
Substituting (11a) in (11b), we obtain: 
                                                                
1
1
1
1 )()(
X~
X~S
X~
X~
∂
∂=∂
Π∂                                                  (12) 
This expression reflects the local truthfulness of the bribe scheme (see Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994). Substituting (12) into (11a) we have: 
                                                           0V
V
)(
1
1
11
1 =∂
∂
∂
∂+∂
Π∂
X~
pT
X~
X~ ρ                                          (13) 
Now, substituting expressions (3) and (7) into (13) and operating, we are able to obtain 
the following expression for the equilibrium value of 1X
~ : 
                                                 [ ])(
2
1
101 dEXTX
~ ++−+= δψδθρτδ                                  (14) 
Subtracting 0X
~  from both sides, noting that – given our assumption of non-negative vacant 
land at moment zero – the size of the built up area at time zero should be equal to the market 
size of the community (i.e. τδ += /dX 00 )3, assuming that exogenous rents are proportional 
to population (i.e. T=μ )0X 4, dividing both sides of (14) by 0X , and operating, we obtain an 
expression of the amount of new land for development during the term, expressed as a 
proportion of the starting size of the town: 
                                            ( )0130211 d/dEx~ Δ++=Δ αναψα                                            (15) 
                                                 
3 To obtain the market size we need simply to equate expression (5) with the development cost function τX1. 
4 Local politicians are able to earn higher wages and enjoy better opportunities for promotion (running for 
higher office) in larger municipalities. Of course, it is debatable whether this effect is captured by a linear 
relationship with town size. The alternative of working with non-relative variables is also problematic, since if T 
grows with the size of the town, then the coefficient of the electoral competition variable will be influenced by 
the size-distribution of the sample of municipalities used. The empirical results ultimately suggest that this 
specification works quite well (see section 4). 
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Where 0011 )/( XX
~X~x~ −=Δ  is the amount of new land put in the market (i.e. allowed to be 
developed) by the local government in period 1 as a proportion of the size of the built-up area 
in period 0, 0010 )/( XXX
~ −=ν  is the amount of vacant land at the beginning of the period 
also as a proportion of the previous built-up area, and ( )01 d/dE Δ  is the expected growth rate 
in demand for locating in the town. The coefficient )2(1 τδδθρμα +−= /  measures the 
effect of political competition on the provision of developable land. Higher levels of political 
competition (higher proportion of swing voters, ψ ) reduce the amount of new land made 
available for development, so that the policy is closer to that preferred by the voters and more 
distant from that sought by the lobby. This moderating effect of political competition on 
policies is found in most theoretical models that analyze the effects of political competition 
on policy formation (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1996, and Wilson and Damania, 2005)5,6.  
The model also predicts the situations in which this competition mechanism can be 
expected to be strongest. Note from expression (15) the effect of political competition 
becomes more marked: (i) as the disamenity effect of growth, δ, rises (ii) the awareness of 
voters about this policy, θ, increases (iii) the time horizon of the politician, ρ, is extended and 
(iv) as rents with town size grow more steeply, as measured by μ. This provides additional 
empirical predictions for our study. For instance, if we were able to split the sample by using 
a proxy variable for the disamenity effect of growth, we would see whether the effect of 
competition is stronger or not in the sample of towns deemed to be more anti-growth.  
Equation (15) is also quite precise regarding the way in which control variables should 
enter the model and how they should be interpreted. Note for instance that both the vacant 
land and demand pressure forecasts enter the model additively, with no interaction with the 
degree of political competition. The vacant land coefficient, 2α  in expression (15), should in 
theory be equal to –1, indicating that vacant land and new land for development should be 
perfect substitutes7. The coefficient τδτδα ++= 23 /  measures the effect of the demand 
increase on the provision of developable land. Note, that this effect increases as the 
disamenity effect of growth, δ, falls. For instance, when δ = 0, 13 =α  and the demand 
increase is fully absorbed by an increase in developable land. Note also that in this case 
                                                 
5 This result is robust to the way in which lobby contributions are modeled. For instance, Grossman and 
Helpman (1996) show that this main result also holds when contributions are channeled to finance campaigns 
and as such are used to buy the votes of a class of uninformed voters. Grossman and Helpman (1996) note 
(p.276) that the equilibrium policies of their 1996 model incorporating two-party competition and lobbying 
through campaign contributions satisfy the same conditions as the objective function of their 1994 paper, which 
is the one used to specify our model (expressions 10a and 10b). 
6 Political agency models also predict that increasing political competition helps reduce rent extraction (e.g. 
Besley et al. 2006, and Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009). 
7 However, there are reasons as to why we should not expect this constraint to hold exactly for the data. It could 
be the case, for example, that the relationship between both variables is nonlinear. For example, if costs have to 
be incurred in passing a new plan, the government might choose not to introduce it despite the fall in vacant land 
(and thus they will choose not to put more land in the market) if the amount of vacant land is sufficiently high.  
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01 =α . This means that when δ =0 local politicians simply follow the market. Of course, 
since they probably make mistakes in forecasting demand pressures, the amount of land 
assigned for development might not always coincide with the amount demanded. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Spanish institutions and the housing cycle 
The framework introduced above is tested with data from Spain’s local governments. In order 
to determine the extent to which the theory matches reality we need a good understanding of 
the workings of both local politics and land regulation in Spain. Thus, to facilitate our 
understanding of how land supply interacts with demand pressures, we also explain briefly 
how these two variables have evolved in the country over the last few decades. 
Local politics. Municipalities are the main tier of local government in Spain8. There are 
nearly 8,000 local government authorities, most of them quite small (i.e. 90% with fewer than 
5,000 inhabitants). Since 1979, municipal councils have been elected governments, with a 
variable number of members (depending on population size) chosen using a proportional 
system. The mayor is then elected by a majority of council members (see Colomer, 1995a, for 
a detailed description of the local political system in Spain). The councils operate as small 
representative democracies, and have to reach a majority vote in order to introduce the 
initiatives and regulations proposed by the mayor, who acts as the agenda-setter. The 
discipline enforced by Spain’s parties means that the chances of amending the mayor’s 
proposals are quite low when the mayor’s party or coalition controls a majority of the seats. 
Direct democracy mechanisms are not used and participatory channels are quite limited. This 
means that a resident’s ability to influence policy has traditionally been limited to their 
decision at the ballot box and, more recently, to their ability to mobilize a group to fight for a 
particular issue (e.g. with demonstrations or through the media).  
Furthermore, the main parties compete for posts on the council and for a member to be 
elected mayor on the basis of a wide range of issues. Land use regulation is a key municipal 
responsibility, but not the only one, as the council is also responsible for the provision of 
various public services and the collection of a number of local taxes. This means that voters 
make their decision at the ballot box in line with a party’s land policy proposals and other 
commitments made in its manifesto or on the basis of personal ideological attachments. It is 
in such a setting that we believe the degree of political competition will have the most impact 
on policy. And, furthermore, there is evidence that the results of the municipal elections are 
                                                 
8Spain also has 50 provinces that serve as a higher tier of local government but which have very limited 
responsibilities, and none regarding land policies, and 17 regional governments that are major suppliers of 
welfare state type services (health, education, welfare assistance) and which have some (secondary) 
responsibilities regarding land policies (see below). 
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influenced by entirely local concerns (such as land regulation) as well as by the 
regional/national popularity of the incumbent party/parties at the time of the election (see 
Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2007). Local elections in Spain can to some extent be seen as by-
elections for regional and general elections. Typically, after the municipal elections, the 
national parties and the media interpret the results as a ‘grand opinion poll’ of their future 
chances of winning elections at higher tiers. This correlation between the aggregate 
popularity of a party and the fate of an incumbent of this party at a local election is a key idea 
in the construction of the instruments we use below. 
Land regulation. Land use regulations in Spain adhere to an extremely interventionist and 
highly rigid system (Riera et al., 1991, 2000). A key characteristic is that, although an 
individual might own the land, the government is empowered to control and implement all 
processes of urban development. Landowners are not permitted to develop their land without 
the prior agreement of the local administration. It is not simply that they need a building 
license (which is in most cases automatically granted): before reaching this step, the 
government must have declared the land ‘developable’ and defined most precisely the 
conditions for such development. The main tool employed by the government for doing this 
is its urban plan. Town planning in Spain is essentially therefore a municipal responsibility, 
but as there are more than 8,000 municipalities nationwide, the system is highly fragmented 
(as in the US). However, the powers are partly shared with regional governments. Thus while 
the municipalities define the plan and control its implementation, the regional government 
must first accept the plan and ensure that all legal regulations are adhered to. Other 
responsibilities of the regional government include the design of supra-municipal plans and 
the declaration of certain areas as protected zones. Yet, in practice, the use of regional power 
to restrict local land use policies has been quite infrequent (Riera, 2000). 
Municipalities draw up a ‘General Plan’, which provides a three-way land classification: 
built-up land, developable land (the areas of the community where future development is 
allowed), and non-developable land  (the rest of the territory - agrarian and other uses, where 
the development process is strictly prohibited, at least until a new plan is accepted). The 
existence of a ‘development border’, a line between plots of land on which developers are 
allowed to build and plots where development is banned, is a key feature of Spain’s land 
regulation system. In periods of high demand this border creates a rent differential which 
might fuel the bribes developers are willing to pay to local politicians in exchange for shifting 
this border to their advantage. This mechanism is well represented by the theoretical model 
presented in the previous section. A further feature of this border is that once it has been fixed 
it is very difficult to remove. The reason for this is that the establishment of the border creates 
certain rights for the landowners, and the only way to change these would be for the 
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government to acquire the land, a transaction that is highly infrequent in Spain. This means 
that while the amount of developable land will either increase from one period to the next or 
remain unaltered, it will not decrease, as is confirmed by our data. 
Logically, the ‘General Plan’ includes very detailed regulations regarding many other 
aspects: land zoning (residential, commercial, industrial), the maximum floor-to-area ratio for 
each plot, the reservation of land for streets, green spaces and public facilities, etc. While it 
would be of great interest to analyze these other regulatory dimensions (after all, a developer 
stands to make more profit not only by building more house but also by building 
constructions with more floors), there are no data available to measure them. It should be 
stressed, however, that most development in Spain in these years has been really quite sparse9, 
and that many of the recent stories about the influence wielded by the developer lobbies refer 
to their obtaining huge amounts of land for development (see, e.g., Martin Mateo, 2007). 
In theory, the ‘General Plan’ has a duration of eight years, but the land classification 
can be quite readily modified by a majority vote in the municipal council. The amendment 
plan, known as a ‘Partial Plan’, is also a legally binding document. A number of participation 
and transparency requirements apply to facilitate scrutiny by the residents, who can seek to 
change the document if they so wish. These requirements are stricter in the case of the initial 
introduction of the ‘General Plan’, but here the transparency of the system is very much 
dependent on the will of local politicians (and this is also probably influenced by the degree 
of political competition they face). To implement the plan politicians can resort to a variety of 
means to introduce the desired amendments, without these changes having to come under 
much scrutiny from residents or the media. This is the case, for example, of the contractual 
arrangements made between local governments and developers, which are permitted under 
Spanish legislation. Such contracts might modify the urban status of a land plot, its floor-to-
area ratio, or renegotiate the terms of payment between developers and the city council. In 
fact, a recent report identified these contracts as the main means for facilitating the 
disproportionate influence enjoyed today by developer lobbies (see Fundación Alternativas, 
2007). 
In short, the system of land use regulation in Spain is characterized by its high degree of 
interventionism and its extremely discretionary nature. Although based on a detailed plan, in 
practice there are various avenues open to local politicians seeking to introduce change. And 
although, in theory, the plan is subject to public scrutiny (yet just how effective this process is, 
is highly questionable), levels of transparency remain fairly low when the plan is being 
drafted and (more specifically) as it is being implemented. The profits of land developers, 
                                                 
9 This is what data from the Corine Land Cover project suggest (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006, see also Hortas 
and Solé-Ollé, 2010). 
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therefore, depend on many largely discretionary political decisions – the primary one being 
the fixing of the ‘development border’, the line separating land on which development is 
allowed from that where it is prohibited – and this provides strong incentives for this lobby to 
offer bribes to politicians.  
Housing cycle. Figure 1 shows the evolution in Spain’s housing market since 1965. The 
dotted line represents the % growth in the housing stock, computed using data from IVIE 
(2005). Five different periods are evident: boom up until 1974, period of sustained bust 
following the first oil crisis in 1974 until 1985, short boom period up to 1991, short bust until 
1995, and finally the long boom period from that year until its abrupt curtailment in 2007 (not 
shown on graph). The similarities between the periods of bust in the housing market (1991-95 
and 1974-85), and those between the boom periods (1969-74 and 1995-2007) are exploited 
when we come to select our instruments (see next section). 
[ Figure 1 about here] 
The bold line represents the growth in urban land (built-up plus developable) as a 
percentage of the previous built-up land available in a municipality. This variable is the one 
we adopt in our empirical analysis (more details in the next section) for measuring the 
amount of new land local governments assign for development each year. Unfortunately, this 
information has only been available since 1990. Note that the graph shows that the supply of 
new developable land fell during the 1991-95 bust and continued to fall during the early 
stages of the boom (1995-99), perhaps reflecting the fact that there was still a lot of vacant 
land available or because local politicians were slow to adapt to the new situation within the 
housing market. Urban land supply started to grow again in 1996 and grew continuously 
throughout the period 1996-2006. These growth rates were especially high at the end of this 
period, outstripping the growth rates in housing stock. The variable, however, plummeted in 
2007 anticipating the future fall in housing construction (not shown on graph). In general, the 
graph suggests that local politicians do indeed respond to demand pressures when 
determining the amount of urban land to supply, but that they also make forecasting mistakes, 
e.g. supplying too much land when the housing market is at the end of a boom.  
3.2 Empirical approach 
The equation we run to estimate the effect of political competition on land supply is based on 
expression (8), and can be written as: 
            %ΔUrban Landi,t4-t0 ,  =  α1%Vote Margini,t1  +   
                             α2 %Vacant Landi,t0   +  α3Zi,t0  +  Σk α4,k fk  +  α5Wi,t0  +   ε i,t                               (16) 
where the empirical counterpart of 1Δx~  is precisely the additional amount of new land 
assigned for development during the term-of-office, computed as a ratio over the previous 
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built-up land area (%ΔUrban Land), and political competition is measured by the 
incumbent’s margin of vote at the following election (%Vote Margin). We provide more 
details as to why we adopt these variables and how we compute them below.  
In the equation we control for the following variables (see data sources in Table 1):  
(i) The previous % of land assigned for development which remains vacant at the 
beginning of the period as a proportion of previous built-up land (%Vacant Land), as 
our theoretically-derived equation suggests. It is necessary to control for this variable 
because if there remains a lot of land for building on there will be no immediate need to 
alter regulations assigning more land for development. Similarly, if there is no vacant 
land at all, there will be considerable pressure to release more land for development in 
order to accommodate possible future demand pressures.  
(ii) A basic set of control variables Z i,t-4 , measuring the main traits that account for recent 
urban growth in Spain, and which include the Urban, Suburb and Beach dummies10. 
The European Environmental Agency (2006) notes that most of the recent housing 
growth in Spain has been concentrated in these places, so we expect them to capture a 
large share of the spatial variation in the increase forecast in housing demand (i.e. 
E(Δd1/d0)). The set also includes the land area under the jurisdiction of the municipality, 
Land area i,t-4, since this represents an obvious constraint on urban growth and accounts 
for a considerable proportion of urban land growth in the period.  
(iii) A full set of local area dummies fk, including both provincial fixed effects and urban 
area fixed effects. These effects are included because the size of the ‘demand increase’ 
(i.e. E(Δd1/d0)) depends to a great extent on certain geographical traits (e.g. the weather, 
proximity to the coast, regional regulatory framework, industry mix, major 
infrastructure such as ports or airports) which are common to municipalities located 
near to each other. We use 50 provincial and 109 urban area dummies. Spanish 
provinces are geographical units, whose primary purpose is to serve as electoral districts 
for national and regional elections. Urban areas are as defined by the AUDES project, 
and have been drawn up using sophisticated geographical criteria (see Table 1). The 
effects of the urban area and province can be introduced simultaneously in the equation; 
in this case, the provincial dummies control for the similarities between the 
municipalities located in the non-urban portion of a province. In any case, as is verified 
in the results section below, the provincial dummies are never jointly statistically 
                                                 
10 We also ran the equation with a more detailed typology in which we differentiated between big and small 
urban areas (Urban × Big, Suburb × Big, Urban × Small, Suburb × Small), taking into account the distance from 
the central city (Suburb × Distance), and using a tourist resort dummy in addition to the beach variable 
(Tourism). These results are not shown here since they do not add enhance the model’s explanatory capacity 
very much.  
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significant, while the urban dummies are, and provide a good explanation for variations 
in local land. 
(iv) A set of additional control variables, W, measuring either the size of the demand 
increase (i.e. E(Δd1/d0)) or the ‘disamentity effects of growth’ (i.e. δ). This set includes: 
(a) Exogenous measures of local demographic and employment shocks: % aged 25-40, 
which measures the number of potential new families at the beginning of the period, % 
immigrants (i.e. those arrived during the period, expressed as % of residents at the 
beginning of the period)11, % employed in industry, and % employed in the top-5 
industries in the region (see Glaeser et al., 1992; Moretti, 2010); (b) Variables that 
account for the amenity and productivity factors deemed important for location 
decisions (i.e. an amenity index, a measure of road accessibility, and the land area of the 
municipality) 12 ; (c) Variables more closely related to a resident’s preferences for 
development (i.e. to δ), but also arguably correlated to ‘demand pressures’ (i.e. % 
commuters, % home-owners, left government, % graduate, % unemployed, population 
size and  per capita income).  
Some of the variables in this group are cited in the literature discussing 
preferences for growth controls. This is the case of % homeowners, a group who 
supposedly prefer less development than is the case of renters, who also suffer the 
population externality but who have to pay the higher rents caused by the restricted 
supply of land (Fischel, 1985; Brueckner, 1999). Higher income communities 
supposedly oppose development too, as more affluent residents will seek to keep the 
poor from moving into town (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993; Downs, 1999). Some 
authors also suggest that places with higher proportions of commuters prefer less 
development, their residents not being concerned with this question as they work 
elsewhere (Fischel, 1985). However, these variables also probably correlate with 
‘demand pressures’ and so it would be very difficult to interpret the results as being 
indicative that these theoretical predictions are fulfilled. Thus, we shall abstain from 
doing this, and use these variables for the same purpose as the others in this group: 
namely to determine how stable the estimates are when controlling for a full list of 
possible determinants of local land supply. The lack of stability of the estimates in the 
OLS case will be proof of serious omitted variable bias, while stability of the IV 
                                                 
11 To avoid concerns of endogeneity, this variable is computed as the sum of the growth rate of new immigrants 
arriving from different countries to the province multiplied by the share of each country in the municipality’s 
immigration figures at the beginning of the period (see Saiz, 2007).  
12  We might have measured ‘demand pressures’ more directly. For example, the equation could have 
incorporated growth in population, employment or in income. However, the chances are high that these 
variables are endogenous: a higher supply of land facilitates population, employment and income growth.  
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estimates will offer additional evidence as to the validity of our instruments (see next 
section). 
However, in order to obtain evidence as to the role of these preference variables, and in order 
to acquire additional validation for our model, we also estimate equation (16) for several sub-
samples. Recall that the coefficient of the electoral competition variable ψ in expression (15) 
is )2(1 τδδθρμα +−= / . This suggests that the effect of political competition becomes more 
marked as the ‘disamenity effect of growth’ δ  increases. To analyze this possibility, we 
divide the sample according to the values of those variables that the theory tells us should be 
correlated with δ : 
(i) We repeat the estimation for the Suburb, City, Non-urban and Beach sub-samples.  
Fischel (1985) suggests that development will be more constrained by regulations in the 
suburbs than in other places, because residents there are less concerned with 
employment opportunities (since they work outside the town). Our data on the % 
commuters allows us to analyze this effect directly by dividing the sample into towns 
with high and low values of this variable. We include Beach cities as a separate 
category in our analysis, given that growth has concentrated there in the Spanish case 
and that, on occasions, the debate regarding the need to limit development is 
particularly intense in such places, involving as it does controversial questions related to 
the convenience or otherwise of preserving environmentally valuable areas (e.g. wild 
beaches, see European Environmental Agency, 2006).  
(ii) We also estimate the equation for samples of high and low % homeowners, which is 
another variable identified in the literature acting as a possible restraint on development. 
In our model, homeowners are interested in restraining development in order to avoid 
the population externality, while renters (although they also suffer this externality) do 
not want to pay the higher rents that the lower supply of land would result in. 
(iii) We provide results for the sub-samples of towns ruled by Left vs. Right governments. 
Governments with an ideology that is left of center - at least in Spain - can be expected 
to show greater concern for the environment and to favor compact development, thus 
tending to place more restrictions on the supply of land. This suggests that the δ  
coefficient will be higher in such cases and so we would expect a more marked 
response by the left to a change in the margin of the vote13. 
As we show in the empirical section below, the division of the sample has no marked effects 
on either the explanatory capacity of the model or the validity of the instruments. However, 
                                                 
13 Furthermore, presenting the results separately for left and right governments is fairly standard practice in the 
literature (see Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009, and Fiva, 2009). 
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these results should be interpreted with care, since they only inform us about the sensitivity of 
each variable and the measure of political competition, yet our analysis still does not reveal 
anything about the overall effect of these variables on land supply14.   
3.3. Sample and data 
Sample. Equation (16) is estimated using data from a sample of 2,034 Spanish municipalities 
for the period 2003-07, which covers exactly one term-of-office. Although our land use data 
(i.e., built-up land area, developable land, vacant land, non-developable land) are available on 
a yearly basis, we have decided to analyze the full period as a cross-section only. The 
dependent variable is, therefore, the increase in developable land between 2003 and 2007, 
and the control variables refer to the year 2003 or earlier (most being taken from the 2001 
Census). There are several reasons for this choice. First, the main variable of interest, %Vote 
margin, can only be measured once, which is when an election takes place. This means that 
there is no real statistical gain to be made in using yearly data. Second, the dependent 
variable does not change every year; developable land only changes when a new urban plan 
is passed, and this is a fairly rare occurrence, happening more frequently when the real estate 
sector is booming. The % of municipalities presenting positive increases in the amount of 
developable land is around 20%. This number is around 75% during the full 2003-07 term-of-
office. Thus, by aggregating the data over the term we reduce the number of censored 
observations considerably in our sample. 
The eventual sample of 2,034 municipalities can be explained by data availability. In 
Spain, there are around 8,000 municipalities, but most of them are very small. The database 
providing information on land use categories covers the whole of Spain, but most of the other 
databases used are restricted to municipalities with over 1,000 inhabitants, which means the 
smallest municipalities have been eliminated from our sample. We have also eliminated from 
our sample those municipalities for which we either lacked political data or for which the 
data was not reliable. Eventually, we were restricted to a sample of 2,034 municipalities. We 
believe this sample to be representative of the full population because by far the vast majority 
of large municipalities (those with more than 5,000 residents) are included. Furthermore, we 
ran a number of checks on the smaller municipalities and found that the average values for 
many of the variables (those for which we have values for the full population) do not differ 
greatly from the overall average. 
                                                 
14 For example, although we include the Left dummy as a control variable in the equation, the results derived 
from it will not be entirely reliable, since it is almost certainly correlated with many other factors. Proper 
identification of the effect of ideology on land supply would require a different method (e.g. ‘regression 
discontinuity’ as in Ferreira and Gyourko 2009). Here, we cannot claim to be doing this, rather we seek to show 
whether the sensitivity of land policy to political competition differs between governments controlled by parties 
of differing ideology.  
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The period analyzed is also a highly interesting one because, as discussed at the outset to 
this paper, urban expansion was very high with the boom in real estate recording peak figures 
during these years. Note that the prediction made by our model regarding the effect of 
political competition only holds in periods when demand pressures are expected to be high15. 
If demand pressures are low, the vacant land is able to accommodate them and new land 
assigned for development is zero, regardless of the levels of political competition. The period 
1996-2002, which covers the first stages of the boom, would also have made an interesting 
study but, unfortunately, we do not have information for many of the variables in these years. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Land use data. The data used to measure the amount of developable land are taken from the 
Spanish property assessment agency and are derived as a by-product of the assessment 
process that this agency undertakes on all properties in the country. Although the values of 
properties are only reassessed from time to time, up-dates in the traits of each property (and, 
hence, its classification as developed, developable but vacant, or non-developable) is 
conducted yearly. The variable used to measure developable land has been constructed as the 
summation of built-up and vacant land areas. This is the only statistical source of data 
covering the whole of Spain that can be used to measure the land use category of 
undeveloped land plots. For example, the very rich data provided by the Corine Land Cover 
project (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006) could not be used in our case because it only measures 
what can be seen (already developed land) but not what has been approved by the local 
government but does not yet physically exist (land allowed to be developed). Recall that we 
believe the variable we use to be the most interesting because it reflects the main land use 
decision taken by local governments. 
% Vote margin. The proportion of swing voters ψ  is usually proxied in the literature by the 
incumbent’s vote margin (Case, 2001; Johansson, 2003; Solé-Ollé, 2006; Besley et al., 2006; 
Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009; Fiva, 2009). The intuition behind this is that, if the vote density 
function is single-peaked and symmetric, then increasing the margin of the vote always 
means a decrease in the density of votes (i.e. in the proportion of swing voters). In real 
settings, however, this might only hold approximately, meaning that the measure is prone to  
measurement error. This explains why some authors have proposed estimating the vote 
density function for each of the jurisdictions using survey data and then computing the 
density at the cut-point (see, e.g., Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). One problem with this 
approach is that the data needed to estimate a different vote density function for each 
                                                 
15 Remember that Δ 1x~ ≥ 0 and that for Δ 1x~  to be positive (see expression 15) the size of the expected demand 
increase should exceed a certain threshold: E(Δd1/d0)>-(α1/α3)Ψ - (α2/α3)ν0. 
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jurisdiction are rarely available, and certainly not in a database containing more than 2,000 
municipalities. At this point, it is interesting to note that Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009) find 
similar results regarding the impact of political competition on political rents in Sweden 
when using either of the two measures: vote margin or estimated cut-point density (using the 
previous estimates by Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). A final consideration is that the 
measurement error problem could be attenuated by the use of Instrumental Variables methods, 
which only a few of the above cited papers apply (Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009; Fiva, 2009). 
Another important point involves deciding which election to use to compute the %Vote 
margin, the previous election (Case, 1999; Johansson, 2003; Solé-Ollé, 2006; Besley et al., 
2006) or the upcoming one (Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2009; Fiva, 2009). Although the use of 
the %Vote margin in the previous election is usually intended to minimize endogeneity 
problems, some authors have suggested that this might not be the case (Larcinese et al., 2006). 
An example should serve to illustrate the possible bias generated by the use of this variable. 
Imagine voters vote prospectively, taking into account parties’ positions regarding future 
development plans. If voters dislike development (as has been hypothesized in our theoretical 
model), then a more expansive plan will result in the incumbent losing some votes. If 
politicians remain true to their promises, then they will implement the plan once in office. 
This means that vote outcomes in t-4 are affected by developments in t/t-4 because more 
development occurs when the incumbent promises to undertake it, and these promises will 
have some effect on the vote. Another problem with using previous election results is that 
they might not actually be very informative in situations of vote volatility, since incumbents 
will probably have the forthcoming elections in mind when introducing the plan. 
Using the margin of the vote recorded in the upcoming elections might increase the 
informational content of the variable but it is also likely to generate endogeneity problems. If 
expanding the amount of developable land has an adverse impact on future votes, then the 
OLS estimates of vote margin will be clearly biased to zero. Therefore, the only way to 
overcome this problem is to find a good instrument for the vote margin. Given our confidence 
in our instruments, we have decided to follow Fiva (2009) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009) 
and use the vote margin in the upcoming local elections (those of 2007) and estimate the 
equation by instrumental variables. The margin of the vote has been computed as the absolute 
value of the difference between the % of votes of the party/parties in local government and 
50%. However, knowing that we might have opted for another solution, in the robustness 
checks we also discuss how the results of the estimation are affected when using the lagged 
vote margin. In the end, we find that both variables yield similar results, once they have been 
properly instrumented. 
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3.4 Econometrics 
The two main econometric problems that need to be dealt with in the estimation of equation 
(16) are the endogeneity of the %Vote margin and the fact that, in a non-negligible proportion 
of municipalities, developable land has not grown during the period analyzed. 
Instruments. The instruments for the %Vote margin should be both relevant (i.e. able to 
explain a considerable proportion of variation in the %Vote margin) and exogenous (i.e., 
correlated with the increase in developable land only through its effects on the %Vote 
margin). We use two instruments that we believe to fulfill both conditions. The first, % 
historical margin, is a vote margin computed using an incumbent’s votes at the 2007 local 
elections as predicted by the votes obtained by the same party or coalition in the 1977 
national legislative elections. To create this instrument, first, we compute the local 
incumbent’s municipal vote share at the 1977 national elections, which we refer to as the % 
historical vote share (see Table 1 for details). Second, we estimate a bivariate relationship 
between the incumbent’s vote share at the 2007 local elections (% municipal vote share) and 
the % historical vote share. Figure 1 shows this bivariate relationship; the OLS estimates are 
presented at the bottom of the figure. Third, we use this regression to compute a predicted 
vote share for the 2007 local elections, and the % historical margin instrument is then the 
absolute value of the difference between this fitted vote figure and 50%.  
[ Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
This instrument is similar to that adopted by Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009) for the 
Swedish case and should be interpreted as the hypothetical % vote margin that the incumbent 
party/parties in the local government at the 2007 elections would face if their votes depended 
only on ideological considerations, which historically can be considered as being quite stable. 
As shown at the bottom of Figure 2, persistent partisanship can account for the 
geographically distinct patterns of voting in Spain, reflecting in all likelihood differences in 
cultural and historical experiences across the country. This persistence in the ideological vote 
would seem to be considerable. For example, it is a documented fact that the provinces in 
which the left won more votes at the first democratic elections held in 1977 were those in 
which the left-wing coalition was most successful in the elections held prior to Franco’s 
dictatorship, in the 1930s16. Note, however, that we are using the results of the national 
legislative elections in 1977 to forecast those of the municipal elections in 2007. But even in 
this case the correlation is quite high17, due to the fact that in Spain municipal elections work 
                                                 
16  For example, the coefficient of correlation between the left vote share at the 1977 and 1936 national 
legislative elections at the provincial level is 0.699 (p-value=0.006). The correlation between the left vote shares 
at the 2008 and 1977 national legislative elections is slightly lower, but still statistically significant: 0.531 (p-
value=0.041) (data from Carreras et al., 2005 and the Ministerio del Interior, www.elecciones.mir.es). 
17 In this case, the correlation coefficient is 0.494 with a p-value of 0.049. 
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partly as by-elections for the forthcoming national elections (held two years later)18. So, it 
seems that our instrument based on the historical partisan vote could serve to forecast actual 
vote margins. In the results section we present a first-stage regression to test the strength of 
the instrument more formally.  
But can this instrument be considered exogenous? For this to be the case, 
Cov(%historical margin, ε) should be zero. The main threat to this assumption is the fact that 
it is very difficult, as we explained above, to control for the increase in demand (i.e. 
E(Δd1/d0)). Despite all our efforts, the error term might still be picking some omitted demand 
pressures. Our instrument could not be considered appropriate if these demand pressures 
were correlated over time (i.e. if the municipalities booming in the last decade were also 
those booming in the 70s) and, simultaneously, political competition was low in these 
municipalities at that time. Let us examine the first of these two conditions. Since the housing 
market differed markedly in the two time periods, enjoying a boom in 2004-07 and suffering 
a bust in 1974-77 (see section 3.1), it is quite plausible that the correlation in demand 
pressures across Spain between the two periods is not very high. The reason for this might be 
that there are some places (e.g. coastal municipalities) that will tend only to show a higher 
(relative) growth in construction during boom periods. This is ultimately testable: the 
correlation between provincial housing stock growth (the same variable as that used in 
section 3.1 and Figure 1) in the two periods of the analysis is just 0.174 (p-value=0.217), and 
the correlation between boom and bust periods in the 70s and in the 90s is also low and not 
statistically significant19. These numbers contrast with the correlation between the periods of 
boom, the coefficients now being high and statistically significant20. So, we are able to argue 
that our instrument is exogenous because the housing market conditions in the two periods 
are very different, while at the same time (as we have explained below) there is some 
correlation in voting patterns. Let us now turn to examine the second condition. We expect 
that this too should be close to zero. The reason is that the causal relationship identified by 
our theoretical model - increasing land supply with the incumbent’s rising vote share - should 
not be present in 1977. Note that this election was the first to be held in Spain after the 
reestablishment of democracy. At that moment, voters tended to vote according to how they 
believed the democratic transition should be handled, either by breaking completely with the 
old system (i.e., rejecting the monarchy) or by reaching an agreement with the elite members 
of the old system (e.g. Colomer, 1995b). Right-wing parties with a national electoral base 
                                                 
18 The correlation between vote shares in these two consecutive elections is very high (the coefficient of 
correlation between left votes shares in the 2007 municipal 2008 is 0.701(p-value=0.006). 
19 The correlation coefficients between periods are: 1969-74 & 1974-77: 0.151 (p-value=0.281), 2004-07 & 
1991-95: 0.174 (p-value=0.217). 
20 In this case the correlation coefficients between periods are: 2004-07 & 2000-04: 0.541 (p-value=0.000), 
2004-07 & 1969-74: 0.456 (p-value=0.000). 
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favored a smooth transition, while left-wing and right-wing regionalist parties were, to 
varying degrees, more in favor of the other solution. Moreover, local governments at that 
time remained administrative agencies of the central government and local mayors were 
appointed officials (the first democratic local elections were not held until 1979), so policy 
decisions (including those concerning land use regulations) were not decided locally. 
However, it might be that despite there being no causal relationship between the two 
variables, they were correlated empirically (e.g. if places experiencing less growth at that 
time were also less competitive politically). To verify this possibility we have correlated the 
provincial left vote share and provincial vote margin in 1977 with housing growth in 1974-77. 
These correlations are found to be very small and non-significant, suggesting that political 
traits were not correlated with demand pressures circa 197721. 
The second instrument is a vote margin computed using the incumbents’ votes at the 
2007 local elections as predicted by the votes obtained by the same (or similar) party at the 
national legislative elections of 2008 at the provincial level. To create this instrument we 
compute the vote share that the local incumbent’s party/parties would obtain at the national 
legislative elections of 2008 if the vote share of each party was the same as that obtained at 
the provincial level, referred to as the % provincial vote share. Again, we run a regression 
between the % municipal vote share and the % provincial vote share, and we use this 
regression to compute a predicted vote share for the 2007 local elections. Finally, we 
compute the predicted vote margin as the absolute value of the difference between 50% and 
the fitted vote figure. 
A similar strategy is also used both by Fiva (2009) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009). 
The idea underlying this instrument is that the vote at the local election is partly determined 
by local considerations and partly by voters’ ideological preferences for a given party. There 
is evidence that this is indeed the case in many countries and especially in Spain (Bosch and 
Solé-Ollé, 2007), where the results of local elections are used to test the real strength of the 
incumbent and the opposition at higher tiers of office. We have already shown how similar 
these two electoral results are. What then about exogeneity? To fulfill this requirement, 
demand increases at the municipal level should not be correlated with increases at the 
provincial level. Although many empirical analyses have shown that housing construction is 
spatially correlated, they also show that this correlation shows spatial decay (Can, 1992). So, 
it is not clear that this correlation will make itself apparent when considering a regional level 
of aggregation. In order to check if this is or not a problem in our case, we have computed 
Moran’s I (Moran, 1950) for the % increase in built-up area at the municipal level during the 
                                                 
21These two correlation coefficients are 0.045 (p-value=0.720) and -0.056 (p-value= 0.691).  
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period of analysis using several weights matrices: (i) first order contiguity, defined as being 
closer than 20 Km, (ii) second order contiguity, between 20 and 40 Km, (iii) third order 
contiguity, between 40 and 60 Km, (iv) fourth order contiguity, more than 60 Km, (v) first 
order contiguity, defined as belonging to the same province, (vi) second order contiguity 
defined as belonging to adjacent provinces, (vii) first order contiguity, defined as belonging 
to the same urban area, and (viii) second order contiguity defined as belonging to the 
province but not to the same urban area. The analysis suggests that spatial correlation in 
housing construction occurs mainly at close distances and within urban areas, but not 
between municipalities belonging to the same political unit (province) but to a different 
economic one (urban area)22. So, we have decided to compute our instrument using the 
aggregate provincial electoral results and discuss in the robustness checks the results when 
using only the vote numbers of municipalities in the province but in a different urban area. 
Censoring. The other problem we need to deal with is the fact that our dependent variable is 
censored. In 545 municipalities (out of 2,034) the local government did not increase the 
amount of developable land during the 2003-07 term-of-office. To deal with this problem we 
estimate an IV-Tobit model, which simultaneously takes into account the censoring and the 
endogeneity problems. This censoring also suggests that it might be of some interest to 
analyze separately the discrete decision to undertake or not a reform of the urban plan. With 
this purpose in mind, we also estimate an IV-Probit model, where the dependent variable is 
the dummy variable l(ΔUrban Landi,t/t-4 >0), which is equal to 1 if there has been a positive 
increase in the amount of urban land and 0 otherwise. 
4. Results 
Tables 2 to 6 show the results of the estimation of expression (15). Tables 2 and 3 show the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates. Column (i) in each 
table shows the results when controlling for the amount of vacant land only. Column (ii) adds 
the basic set of demand controls (i.e. Urban, Suburb and Beach dummies, and Land area). 
Columns (iii) and (iv) add the provincial and urban area fixed effects to the equation, 
respectively, and column (v) extends the control set to include variables that proxy demand 
pressures and/or the disamenity effects of growth (i.e., % employed in industry, % employed 
in the top-5 industries, amenity index, road accessibility, land area, % commuters, % 
homeowners, left, % graduate, % unemployed, population size and per capita income). The 
remaining columns show the results obtained with combinations of the above controls. Table 
4 shows the results when taking into account the censoring of the dependent variable. We 
                                                 
22 Moran’s I (and p-value) for these eight cases are: (i) 0.407, (ii) 0.170, (iii) 0.062, (iv) 0.020, (v) 0.072, (vi) 
0.001, (vii) 0.134, and (viii) 0.034.  
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estimate a Tobit and a Probit equation, both by Maximum Likelihood (columns (i) and (ii)) 
and by IV (columns (iii) and (iv)). The Tobit includes the complete set of controls, but not the 
provincial and urban area fixed effects (since they where not statistically significant in this 
case), and the Probit includes all the controls plus the urban area fixed effects. Table 5 
presents the results of several robustness checks. Finally, Table 6 estimates the equation for 
several sub-samples to determine whether the effect of political competition is higher or not 
in municipalities where the disamenity effects of growth are supposedly stronger. We present 
results by: type of municipality (Suburb, City, Non-Urban & Beach dummies, see Table 1), 
% commuters (high and low) and % homeowners (high and low), and ideology (Left, Right).  
OLS results. The first column in Table 1 shows a positive and statistically significant effect 
of local political competition on the amount of land that local governments put in the market 
(i.e., declare as developable) during a term-of-office. The point estimate suggests that 
increasing the margin of victory by 1% (i.e., moving from 50% to 51% of the vote) would 
have led to a growth in developable land of 0.929% points during the period 2003-07 (when 
compared to the previous area of built up land in the town). Thus, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the vote margin (8.22%) would have resulted in a 7% increase in the standard 
deviation of the increase in developable land. However, the results obtained when including 
the various control groups cast some doubts on the validity of this conclusion. Point estimates 
fall by half when we include the basic set of controls and by two thirds when we include the 
fixed effects (provincial or urban area) or the additional controls. In three instances: with 
provincial dummies, with additional controls, or simultaneously with both at the same time, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant or it is significant solely at the 10% level. It is 
true, however, that provincial dummies (columns (iii), (vi) and (viii)) are not statistically 
significant and that additional controls are significant but both the p-values and explanatory 
capacity (in terms of R2) are quite low23. Additionally (but for reasons of space not included 
in the table), a few of the coefficients of these additional controls are statistically significant 
individually, albeit at the 90% level24. Ultimately, the instability of the coefficients suggests 
that OLS are affected by omitted variable bias, a result that seems plausible given the 
difficulty of measuring demand shocks appropriately.  
[Insert Table 2] 
                                                 
23 Note that the main controls (%Vacant land, Land area, and Urban, Suburb and Beach dummies) explain a 
sizeable proportion of the variation in the increase in developable land, with the R2 jumping from 10% to around 
40%; the inclusion of urban area dummies adds a further 4%. 
24 % commuters and % homeowners are statistically significant at the 90% level and display a negative sign, 
which is consistent with the interpretation of these variables as proxying the disamenity effects of growth. 
However, as explained in section 4.2, given the difficulty of disentangling these effects from demand pressures, 
any attempt at interpreting these results would be inappropriate. The remaining variables are not statistically 
significant individually, although appropriate F-tests rule out (just) their elimination from the equation. 
Complete results are available upon request. 
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Moreover, the addition of different types of controls does not seem to lead to a reduc-
tion in the magnitude of the other type of bias, namely that derived from the endogeneity of 
the margin of the vote. If the increase in developable land has such a detrimental impact on 
voting prospects (as expression (9) suggests), then we should expect the OLS coefficients to 
be biased towards zero, the true coefficients being higher than those reported in Table 1. Note 
that the addition of controls reduces the size of the OLS coefficient, suggesting an upward 
bias, which does not therefore help to reduce the (hypothetical) endogeneity bias.  
IV results. Table 3 shows the IV estimates of the same equations. The instruments used here 
are as described in section 4.2: % historical vote margin and % provincial vote margin. The 
top panel shows the first-stage results. Note that both instruments have a positive and 
significant effect on the % Vote margin. The bottom of the panel includes the partial F-
statistic and the Craig-Donald minimum eigenvalue F-statistic for the first stage. The first 
statistic presents a value that is much higher than ten, which is the ‘rule-of-thumb’ used in the 
literature (Staiger and Stock, 1997)25, suggesting that the instruments are able to explain a 
sizeable portion of the variation in the margin of the vote. A more precise test is the Craig-
Donald F-statistic, which in any case corroborates the validity of the instrument, since the 
statistic is in all cases much higher than the values tabulated at a 5% maximal IV relative bias 
(Stock and Yogo, 2002). This result holds for all the specifications, and is therefore robust to 
the inclusion of the different sets of controls, including provincial and urban area fixed 
effects. Note also that both instruments are relevant in all equations, so our conclusions are 
not driven by just one of them. 
[Insert Table 3] 
The bottom panel shows the second stage results. The Hansen-J test, at the bottom of 
the panel, suggests that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, with p-values 
ranging from 0.3 to 0.7, and which are high enough for us to be confident of the power of this 
test. As for the results, two findings are worth highlighting. First, the vote margin coefficient 
is now around 2%, which means that the estimated effect of political competition on the 
provision of developable land is twice that of the largest OLS estimates reported in Table 1: 
an increase in one standard deviation in the vote margin generates an increase in the amount 
of developable land of around 17% of the standard deviation in the growth of developable 
land during the period analyzed. Second, the estimated coefficient is fairly stable across 
specifications, not being greatly affected by the inclusion of the different sets of controls. 
                                                 
25 To take into account the fact that one of the instruments (provincial vote margin) draws on data aggregated at 
the provincial level (i.e., the provincial vote shares of the different parties), albeit combined with the actual 
composition of the local government, we cluster standard errors at the provincial level, a fact that is also taken 
into account in the computation of the first-stage F-statistics. 
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This constitutes an additional check on the validity of the instruments (see Altonji et al., 2005, 
and Dahlberg et al., 2008). Finally, it could be instructive to compare the magnitude of the 
OLS and IV results. Note that the IV results suggest that, the OLS coefficients are downward 
biased. This is consistent with our theory, which assumes that land development detracts 
votes.  
Tobit & Probit results. One possible problem of the results presented up to this juncture is 
that they do not take into account the censored nature of the dependent variable. 
Approximately a quarter of the municipalities in our sample did not increase the amount of 
developable land made available during the period analyzed. In these cases the dependent 
variable is just zero. To deal with this problem we estimate a Tobit model both by Maximum 
Likelihood (ML), to deal specifically with the zero-censoring problem, and by Instrumental 
Variables to take into account the endogeneity of the vote margin variable. We also analyze 
by means of a Probit the decision to amend the plan, increasing the amount of developable 
land; the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the increase in developable land is 
positive and zero if not.  
[Insert Table 4] 
The first two columns in Table 3 show the Tobit results when including both the basic 
and the additional sets of controls. Neither the provincial nor the urban area dummies are 
included, since they are not jointly significant. The vote margin coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 99% level in both cases, Tobit-ML and IV-Tobit, and are higher than their 
OLS and IV counterparts, as expected. Columns (iii) and (iv) show the Probit results when 
including all the controls plus the urban area dummies. In both cases, Probit and IV-Probit, 
the vote margin is statistically significant at the 99% level. Also here, the IV coefficient is 
higher than that of the standard Probit. We can conclude, therefore, that stiffer electoral 
competition reduces the probability that a local government will undertake a reform of the 
plan and thereby increase the amount of developable land26. 
Robustness checks. Table 5 presents the results obtained when estimating the urban land 
growth equation with different instruments and when adopting a different method for 
computing our political competition variable. The first two columns present the results 
obtained when using just one instrument, either the historical or the provincial. The IV results 
remain basically unaltered. The provincial is not as strong as the historical instrument 
(although it also passes the weak instrument tests) and the estimated coefficients are almost 
                                                 
26 It is worth noting that, contrary to results with the other specifications, here most of the additional control 
variables are statistically significant. Specifically, increasing % commuters and % homeowners has a negative 
and statistically significant effect (at the 95% level) on the probability of modifying the plan. Nevertheless, the 
any interpretation of these results is, as in the previous cases, hindered by the difficulty of controlling for 
demand shocks. Complete results are available upon request. 
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identical, suggesting that both instruments are indeed exogenous. The following two columns 
replace the provincial instrument with a similar instrument that uses the votes obtained in the 
municipalities of the province but not in the same urban area. Remember that there was some 
concern about the possibility that housing construction was spatially correlated; we argued 
that this spatial correlation would be stronger at short distances (i.e. within the same urban 
area) and that, given the greater size of the province it might well be the case that this 
problem does not emerge when using provincial voting numbers. The results presented in 
Table 5 suggest that this might indeed be the case since they are virtually the same in both 
instances. The last four columns repeat the analysis but replacing the vote margin computed 
on the basis of the 2007 local election results with a lagged vote margin, computed using the 
2003 results. The OLS results are now much higher (the corresponding coefficient in Table 2 
was 0.331), but the IV results, using the two instruments together or separately, are quite 
similar, with the point estimates also being quite close to two. These results, together with 
that of Hansen’s J test, suggest that the instruments are exogenous. Note, however, that in this 
case the instruments have problems in passing the weak instrument tests (at least at the level 
of stringency set previously) and that the estimates are also less precise. Overall, the lagged 
definition of the vote margin also seems to work well: the OLS bias seems to be lower, and 
with our instruments, while results are not as good as before, they do not differ dramatically. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Heterogeneous effects. Table 6 explores the effect of electoral competition in various sub-
samples of municipalities in order to determine whether this effect is indeed stronger in 
municipalities where the disamenity effects of growth - the δ coefficient - are stronger. Recall 
that this parameter is part of the 1α  parameter corresponding to the swing voter variable ψ in 
expression (8). Although some variables proxying these disamenity effects have already been 
included as controls in the equation, we argue that any interpretation of these results is not 
straightforward. It is more promising to see if the vote margin coefficient as estimated by IV 
(which can be consistently estimated) is indeed higher in samples where the δ coefficient is 
expected to be higher. With this purpose in mind, we divided the sample into the following 
subsamples: (i) Urban type (Suburb, City, Non-urban and Beach), (iii) Preference-for-growth 
variables: % commuters, % homeowners, (iv) Ideology of the incumbent (Left, Right).  
[Insert Table 6] 
Part (i) of Table 4 reports the results by urban type. The results suggest that a higher 
vote margin has a stronger impact on growth in Suburbs than in Non-urban communities, and 
that the lowest impact is on the growth in central Cities. These results are consistent with 
predictions made by Fischel (1985) which consider that people in the suburbs (a high 
proportion of whom are commuters) do not care about the positive consequences of growth 
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(e.g., more employment opportunities), something which is not true in either central cities or 
non-urban communities, which operate as more self-contained economies. There is some 
evidence, therefore, to suggest that differences in the degree of political competition have 
more pronounced effects in suburban areas, which ultimately means that urban growth has a 
more marked impact on the utility of their residents. The last case of part (i) shows the results 
for beach communities, with a coefficient that is fairly similar to that obtained for the full 
sample.  
Part (ii) of Table 5 reports the results of the sub-samples with high and low % 
commuters and high and low % homeowners. A town is considered to have a high % of 
commuters if this variable is higher than the median, while it is considered to have a low % 
of homeowners (i.e., a high % of renters) if the variable is in the lowest quartile27. In both 
cases, we expect the response to political competition to be stronger in the high % cases. This 
is because homeowners supposedly dislike growth more than renters (that suffer the 
disamenity created by new residents as homeowners, but who have to pay the additional rents 
caused by a restriction in land supply, see Brueckner, 1995) and commuters supposedly 
dislike growth more than people working in the same community (because they also value the 
better employment opportunities associated with growth, see Fischel, 1985). The results in 
Table 5 show that this is indeed the case, with the effect of political competition on land 
supply in commuter towns being nearly four times that recorded in towns with fewer com-
muters, while the effect in towns with many homeowners is 50% higher than in that recorded 
in other places.  
Part (iii) of Table 5 reports the effect when the sample is split by political ideology into 
towns on the left and right of the political spectrum (see Table 1). In Spain, parties on the 
political left typically attach greater weight to environmental issues (and thus are considered 
‘greener’) than those to the right, a situation that is exacerbated in Spain by the fact that true 
‘green’ parties are marginal to the Spanish political system. Urban plans tend to be 
considered ‘greener’ if they limit the consumption of open land. ‘Compact development’ - as 
opposed to urban sprawl - and ‘smart growth’ are terms with a clear association with Spain’s 
left-of-centre parties. So, if local governments on the political left prefer less expansive land 
policies than those promoted by the right, we can also expect an increase in the margin of the 
vote to have a more marked effect in towns governed by the left. The results of Part (iii) in 
Table 5 show that this is indeed the case, the vote margin coefficient being nearly two times 
higher for governments on the political left.  
                                                 
27 These rules have been chosen because, while the distribution of %commuters is quite symmetrical, that of % 
renters is asymmetrical with a very long right tail (i.e., most Spanish municipalities have a low % of renters and 
only a few have a very high %). 
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5. Conclusion 
We have analyzed whether the degree of political competition can influence the decision of 
local government authorities in Spain to assign more (or less) land for development. Our 
findings show that during the 2003-07 term-of-office, coinciding with the peak in the 
country’s last housing boom, the influence was indeed marked. Our IV estimates suggest that 
an increase of one standard deviation in the % Vote margin caused the amount of developable 
land to grow by around 17% of its standard deviation, which is a non-negligible number. In 
addition, we have shown that the impact of political competition is even more marked in 
municipalities where residents supposedly do not have any interest in development, as is the 
case of the suburbs or areas with a high percentage of commuters, where the above numbers 
are 29% and 45%, respectively. 
We interpret these results to show that the different views regarding which groups have 
most influence on local land use policies (homeowners, renters, owners of undeveloped land 
or developers) are compatible. Towns with many commuters and homeowners introduce 
much more restrictive land policies when political competition is high than when it is low. 
This classical view is, however, compatible with developers lobbying politicians in order to 
obtain more expansive land policies, a situation that occurs when political competition is 
sufficiently low. The theoretical model presented allows for these two possibilities: 
depending on the degree of political competition resident voters or developers will tend to 
dominate the political process. However, in a significant number of Spanish municipalities, 
the degree of political competition is quite low, giving rise to the serious risk that local 
governments can be captured by developer lobbies.  
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Table 1:  
Definitions and sources of the variables 
 Definition Sources 
% ΔUrban land 
 
[(Built-up land + Vacant land in 2007) – (Built-up 
+ Vacant land in 2003) / Built up land in 2003] × 
100  
% Vacant land 
 
[Vacant land in 2003) / 
Built up land in 2003] × 100 
DCG, Dirección General del Catastro (2007): 
“Estadísticas sobre ordenanzas fiscales del 
Impuesto sobre Bienes Inmuebles. 
Metodología empleada”, http://www. 
catastro.meh.es / esp/estadisticas1. 
asp#menu1. (Built-up land = ‘superficie 
edificada’, Vacant land = superficie de 
solares) 
 
land area 
 
[Total land area under the jurisdiction of the 
municipality / Built-up land 2003] × 100 
INE (www.ine.es) & 
 DCG, Dirección General del Catastro (2007) 
% Vote margin 
 
[abs(0.5 – vote share parties in the local gov.  
2003-07) in the 07 local elections] × 100 
% Vote margint-4 
 
[abs(0.5 – vote share parties in the local gov.  
2003-07) in the 03 local elections] × 100 
% Historical 
margin 
 
% Provincial 
margin 
 
[abs(0.5 – predicted vote share parties in the local 
gov.  2003-07) in the 07 local elections ] × 100 
Predicted vote share, either of: 
 f(vote share same party/parties obtained in the 
1977 national legislative elections) 
f(vote share same party/parties obtained in the 
2008 national legislative elections at the 
provincial level) 
 
 
 
 
Ministerio del Interior, Base Histórica de 
Resultados Electorales, http://www. 
elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp /resultados 
index.htm. 
&  El País (2003): ‘Anuario Estadístico’ 
Urban  
 
Dummy = 1 if municipality  
belongs to an urban area 
Suburb 
 
Dummy = 1 if municipality belongs to an urban 
area but is not the central city 
 
AUDES project, 109 urban areas defined 
using aerial photographs on the basis of 
geographical continuity (see www. audes.es), 
% aged 25-40 [Residents aged 25 to 40 in 2001/ Resident 
population in 2001] × 100 
% immigrants [Immigrants by nationality in 2001 × Regional 
growth rate by nationality 2003-07/ Resident 
population in 2001 ] × 100 
 
 
INE (www.ine.es), 2001 Census of Population 
% employed in 
industry 
[ Employed in industry in 2001/ Employment 
2001] × 100 
% employed in the 
top-5 industries 
 
[ Employed in the 5-fastest growing industries in 
the country during 2003-07 as of 2001/ 
Employment 2001] × 100 
 
 
Social Security Register  
Employment Database 
amenity index 
 
[Houses with problems related to: noise, dirtiness, 
crime, pollution, or lack of green space, 
 as of 2001/ Houses in 2001] × 100 
road accessibility 
 
[Houses with poor accessibility to roads,  
as of 2001/ Houses in 2001] × 100 
 
 
INE (www.ine.es), 2001 Census of Buildings 
% commuters 
 
[Commuters in 2001/ Resident  
population in 2001] × 100 
% homeowners 
 
[Houses occupied by owner in 2001/  
Houses in 2001] × 100 
% graduate 
 
[Residents with a higher education degree in 
2001/ Resident population in 2001] × 100 
% unemployed 
 
[Residents which were unemployed in 2001/ 
Resident population in 2001] × 100 
population size Resident population in 2001 
 
 
 
 
INE (www.ine.es), 2001 Census of Population 
& ‘Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales’ 
(several years) 
per capita income 
 
Personal income / Resident population La Caixa (2001): 
 ‘Anuario Económico de España’ 
left Dummy = 1 if the mayor belongs to a left party 
during the 2003-07 term. Parties on the left are: 
PSOE, PCE, IC and several left regionalist parties 
 
El País (2003): ‘Anuario Estadístico’ 
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Table 2: OLS estimates of the effects of political competition (%Vote margin) on land supply.  
%Δ Urban land as dependent variable:. Sample: 2034 Spanish municipalities during the term-of-office 2003-2007.  
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
% Vote margin 
 
0.918 
   (4.14)*** 
0.507 
   (3.42)*** 
0.320 
(1.59) 
0.331 
(3.22)*** 
0.301 
(1.68)* 
0.328 
(2.98)*** 
0.330 
(2.76)*** 
0.298 
(1.62) 
0.332 
(2.34)*** 
% Vacant land 
 
--.-- -0.678 
(-4.86)*** 
-0.713 
(-5.64)*** 
-0.680 
(-4.91)*** 
-0.718 
(-13.85)*** 
-0.654 
(-4.45)*** 
-0.698 
(-4.32)*** 
-0.703 
(-13.44)*** 
-0.676 
(-4.21)*** 
Urban  
 
--.-- 8.455 
(2.57)** 
3.859 
(1.41) 
--.-- 2.321 
(2.55)** 
--.-- --.-- 2.112 
(1.45) 
--.-- 
Suburb 
 
--.-- 9.711 
(2.45)*** 
8.764 
(2.33)** 
17.045 
(2.59)*** 
7.481 
(1.89)* 
12.223 
(2.67)*** 
8.911 
(2.47)*** 
7.541 
(1.91)* 
9.213 
(2.03)** 
Beach  
 
--.-- 13.383 
(2.84)*** 
10.764 
(1.92)* 
12.068 
(2.62)*** 
10.930 
(2.45)*** 
10.177 
(2.59)*** 
10.003 
(2.28)** 
10.256 
(2.74)*** 
10.112 
(2.22)** 
Land area 
 
--.-- 0.078 
(5.67)*** 
0.077 
(5.78)*** 
0.078 
(5.76)*** 
0.077 
(9.62)*** 
0.079 
(5.99)*** 
0.079 
(7.38)*** 
0.075 
(9.33)*** 
0.079 
(7.00)*** 
R2 0.150 0.401 0.410 0.438 0.418 0.411 0.450 0.432 0.452 
F-stat. (All variables) 10.64 [0.000] 58.94 [0.000] 15.75 [0.000] 19.66 [0.000] 20.22 [0.000] 18.33 [0.000] 28.05 [0.000] 22.36 [0.000] 30.44 [0.000] 
F-stat. (Provincial dummies) 
 
--.-- --.-- 1.11 [0.287] --.-- --.-- 0.38 [0.912] --.-- 1.32 [0.155] 0.32 [0.999] 
F-stat. (Urban area dummies) 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 3.79 [0.001] --.-- 3.58 [0.002] 3.58 [0.002] --.-- 3.65 [0.001] 
F-stat. (Additional controls) --.-- 5.04 [0.001] --.-- --.-- 2.08 [0.044] --.-- 1.57 [0.101] 2.00 [0.042] 1.66 [0.091] 
Main controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Provincial dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES
Urban area dummies NO NO NO YES NO YES YES NO YES
Additional controls NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES YES
 
Notes:  (1) %Δ Urban land = percentage increase in urban land area / developed land). (2) t-statistics in parenthesis; p-values in brackets; ***, ** & * = statistically significant at 
the 99, 95 and 90% levels. (3) Robust standard errors. (4) Additional controls include: % employed in industry, % employed in the top-5 industries, amenity index, road 
accessibility, land area, % commuters, % homeowners, left, % graduate, % unemployed, population size and  per capita income; see Table 1 for the definition and sources of the 
variables. (5) F-stat. (all variables) = test of joint statistical significance of all variables; F-stat. (Provincial dummies) = test of statistical significance of the provincial dummy set, 
F-stat. (Urban area dummies) = test of statistical significance of the urban area dummy set; F-stat. (additional controls) = test of statistical significance of the additional control 
variables. 
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Table 3: Table 4: IV estimates of the effects of political competition (%Vote margin) on land supply. Sample: 2034 Spanish municipalities 2003-2007. 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
(a) First-stage results (% Vote margin as dependent variable) 
% Historical vote margin 
 
0.681 
(4.91)*** 
0.642 
(5.22)*** 
0.660 
(4.22)*** 
0.671 
(4.66)*** 
0.728 
(4.56)*** 
0.644 
(4.70)*** 
0.655 
(4.76)*** 
0.692 
(4.48)*** 
0.703 
(4.33)*** 
% Provincial vote margin 
 
0.322 
(2.57)*** 
0.354 
(2.87)*** 
0.319 
(2.55)*** 
0.346 
(2.63)*** 
0.303 
(2.50)*** 
0.290 
(2.68)*** 
0.314 
(2.77)*** 
0.277 
(2.39)*** 
0.286 
(2.45)*** 
R2 0.300 0.351 0.347 0.420 0.418 0.415 0.425 0.402 0.432 
Partial F-stat (1st stage) 50.10 [0.000] 66.98 [0.000] 33.74 [0.000] 28.23 [0.000] 25.51 [0.000] 27.33 [0.000] 28.45 [0.000] 25.30 [0.000] 26.09 [0.000] 
Craig-Donald  F-stat  45.34♣ 54.08♣ 32.67♣ 25.44♣ 26.78♣ 28.33♣ 27.47♣ 29.42♣ 26.19♣ 
(b) Second-stage results (%Δ Urban land as dependent variable) 
% Vote margin 
 
2.231 
   (4.78)*** 
2.108 
   (3.68)*** 
1.939 
(1.99)** 
2.109 
   (3.68)*** 
1.975 
(2.10)** 
2.043 
   (3.55)*** 
2.154 
   (3.31)*** 
1.926 
   (2.03)** 
2.137 
   (3.26)*** 
% Vacant land 
 
--.-- -0.727 
(-5.56)*** 
-0.713 
(-5.64)*** 
-0.727 
(-5.56)*** 
-0.719 
(-5.39)*** 
-0.705 
(-5.42)*** 
-0.734 
(-5.62)*** 
-0.712 
(-5.01)*** 
-0.732 
(-5.25)*** 
Urban  
 
--.-- 4.901 
(0.94) 
3.859 
(1.41) 
--.-- 4.111 
(1.44) 
--.-- --.-- 3.872 
(1.22) 
--.-- 
Suburb 
 
--.-- 11.567 
(2.30)*** 
8.764 
(2.33)*** 
11.567 
(2.30)*** 
7.362 
(2.00)** 
8.121 
(2.01)** 
10.219 
(2.55)*** 
7.672 
(2.00)** 
10.328 
(2.35)*** 
Beach  
 
--.-- 9.653 
(2.13)** 
10.764 
(1.92)* 
9.653 
(2.13)** 
10.428 
(2.18)** 
10.666 
(1.98)** 
9.773 
(2.08)** 
10.086 
(1.77)* 
9.605 
(2.10)** 
Land area 
 
--.-- 0.077 
(5.78)*** 
0.077 
(5.78)*** 
0.077 
(5.78)*** 
0.078 
(5.76)*** 
0.078 
(5.65)*** 
0.079 
(5.45)*** 
0.073 
(5.62)*** 
0.075 
(5.49)*** 
R2 0.226 0.351 0.347 0.420 0.418 0.409 0.415 0.418 0.408 
Hansen’s J 0.249 [0.610] 1.398 [0.407] 1.399 [0.409] 0.904 [0.342] 0.164 [0.685] 0.920 [0.333] 0.918 [0.330] 1.335 [0.398] 0.911 [0.339] 
Main controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Urban area dummies NO NO NO YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Additional controls NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Notes: (1) F-stat (1st stage): partial F-statistic of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression. (2) Craig-Donald F-statistic to test for weak instruments; ♣ = statistic 
exceeds Stock and Yogo’s weak ID tests critical values at 5% maximal IV relative bias (see Stock and Yogo, 2002);  (3) Excluded instruments: % historical vote margin 
(computed with municipal data of the 1977 national legislative elections) and % provincial vote margin (computed with provincial data of the 2008 national legislative 
elections). (4) Hansen’s J: overidentification statistic.  
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Table 4: 
Tobit & Probit estimates of the effects of political competition  
(%Vote margin) on land supply. %Δ Urban land as dependent variable:  
Sample: 2034  Spanish municipalities during the term-of-office 2003-2007. 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 Tobit IV-Tobit Probit IV-Probit 
% Vote margin 
 
0.522 
   (2.51)*** 
2.600 
(2.08)*** 
0.007 
(2.79)*** 
0.024 
(4.75)*** 
% Vacant land 
 
-0.727 
(-5.94)*** 
-0.719 
(-5.85)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.23)** 
-0.002 
(-2.35)*** 
Urban  
 
1.571 
(1.00) 
2.031 
(1.211) 
--.-- --.-- 
Suburb 
 
31.527 
(3.32)***  
22.412 
(3.04)*** 
0.511 
(5.97)*** 
0.312 
(4.24)*** 
Beach  
 
25.700 
(2.29)*** 
22.938 
(2.26)*** 
0.262 
(2.55)*** 
0.303 
(3.12)*** 
Land area 
 
0.088 
(5.88)*** 
0.088 
(6.32)*** 
0.0002 
(2.71)*** 
0.0002 
(2.68)*** 
F-stat. or χ2-stat  (all variables) 18.07 [0.000] 11.27 [0.000] 69.24 [0.000] 180.33 [0.000] 
F-stat. or χ2-stat  (Urban area dummies) 
 
1.12 [0.277] 1.00 [0.256] 57.47 [0.000] 30.22 [0.000] 
F-stat. or χ2-stat  (added controls) 4.49 [0.001] 5.21 [0.000] 40.36 [0.000] 45.98 [0.000] 
Provincial dummies NO NO NO NO 
Urban area dummies NO NO YES YES 
Additional controls YES YES YES YES 
 Notes:  (1) See Table 1. (2) Number of censored observations is 545 (out of 2034). (3)IV-Tobit & IV-Probit 
models estimated by Maximum Likelihood. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks on the estimates of the effects of political competition 
 (%Vote margin) on land supply. Sample: 2034 Spanish municipalities 2003-2007. 
 (i) Just one instrument (ii) Rest-of-province instrument (iii) Lagged vote margin 
 IV with % 
historical
IV with % 
provincial 
IV- two 
instruments
IV with % rest-
of-province OLS 
IV- two 
instruments
IV with % 
historical
IV with % 
provincial 
% Vote margin 
 
2.124 
   (3.55)*** 
2.004 
   (2.23)** 
2.100 
   (3.44)*** 
1.966 
   (2.68)*** 
0.799   
(2.23)** 
1.876 
   (1.68)* 
1.885 
(2.23)** 
1.764 
   (1.55) 
Partial F-stat (1st stage) 30.34 [0.000] 15.66 [0.000] 25.30 [0.000] 14.55 [0.000] --.-- 12.82 [0.000] 10.55 [0.000] 8.33 [0.000] 
Craig-Donald  F-stat  33.67♣ 18.22♣ 23.42♣ 18.33♣ --.-- 18.03 19.38 14.33
Hansen’s J --.-- --.-- 1.235 [0.403] --.-- --.-- 0.888 [0.350] --.-- --.-- 
Notes: (1) See Table 2 to 4. (2) Main control and urban area dummies included in all equations. (3) Lagged vote margin (% Vote margint-4) computed with the votes 
the party/parties in the local government during 2003-07 obtained in the 2003 local elections. (4) % rest-of-province margin computed with the votes the party of the 
local incumbent obtained in the municipalities belonging to the province but not to the same urban area.  
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6
1,965 1,970 1,975 1,980 1,985 1,990 1,995 2,000 2,005
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Housing stock growth Urban land growth
Table 6:  Sub-sample  IV estimates of the effects of political competition 
 (%Vote margin) on land supply. %Δ Urban land as dependent variable: 
Sample: 2034 Spanish municipalities during the term-of-office 2003-2007. 
 % Vote margin R2 F-stat.  
(all vars) 
F-stat  
(1st stage) 
Hansen’s J 
(i) By urban type
Suburb 
(N=633) 
3.729 
(2.08)** 
0.356 24.77 [0.000] 19.67 [0.000] 0.163 [0.680] 
City  
(N=108) 
1.083 
(2.94)*** 
0.666 23.48 [0.000] 21.89 [0.000] 0.078 [0.779] 
Non-urban 
 (N=1293) 
1.873 
(4.07)*** 
0.450 50.77 [0.000] 36.61 [0.000] 1.272 [0.259] 
Beach 
(N=217) 
2.313 
(2.21)** 
0.418 24.19 [0.000] 15.68 [0.000] 2.589 [0.108] 
(ii) By preference-for-growth proxies
High % commuters 
 (N=1017) 
5.731 
(2.33)*** 
0.368 23.40 [0.000] 19.2 [0.000] 0.033 [0.856] 
Low % commuters 
 (N=1017) 
1.551 
(1.76)* 
0.420 24.37 [0.000] 14.33 [0.000] 0.026 [0.860] 
High % homeowners 
 (N=1183) 
2.501 
(3.33)*** 
0.347 21.09 [0.000] 30.23 [0.000] 0.033 [0.856] 
Low % homeowners 
 (N=453) 
1.711 
(2.78)*** 
0.446 40.55 [0.000] 21.67 [0.000] 0.026 [0.860] 
(iii) By ideology
Left (N=847) 
 
2.297 
(2.56)*** 
0.262 39.02 [0.000] 15.66 [0.000] 0.027 [0.868] 
Right (N=789) 
 
1.414 
(2.41)*** 
0.502 20.16 [0.000] 23.11 [0.000] 0.146 [0.702] 
Notes:  (1) See Table 2. (2) All equations include the basic control variables: Vacant land, Land area, & 
Urban, Suburb, Beach & Urban area dummies when appropriate. 
 
Figure 1:  
The Spanish construction cycle: Housing stock growth,   
1965-2007, & urban land area growth, 1991-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Housing stock growth = % growth of the residential housing construction stock, computed as the 
ratio between yearly real investment in housing and the real money value of the previous year’s housing 
stock; data from IVIE (2005); shown on the left axis; (2) Urban land growth: Growth of urban land area 
(Growth in built-up + Vacant developable land), as a percentage of previous year’s built-up land area; data 
from ‘Dirección General del Catastro’ (several years); shown on the right axis. 
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Figure 2:  
% incumbent’s vote share at the local elections 
 (% local vote)  against % incumbent’s historical vote share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) % local vote = % vote share at the 2007 local elections of the party/parties in the local 
government during the previous term of office (2003-07); (2) % historical vote = % vote share at the 1977 
general elections of the party/parties in the local government during the 2003-07 term of office. (3)  Bold 
line is the regression line: 
                                                    % local vote   =     0.48     +    0.06  ×  % historical vote 
                                                                                  (76.21)***    (4.41)*** 
F(1,2034) = 19.47 (0.00), Standard errors clustered at the provincial level. N = 2034. 
 
 
Figure 3:  
% incumbent’s vote share at the local elections 
 (% local vote) against % incumbent’s provincial vote share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) % local vote = % vote share at the 2007 local elections of the party/parties in the local 
government during the previous term of office (2003-07); (2) % provincial vote = % provincial vote share 
at the 2008 general elections of the party/parties in the local government during the 2003-07 term of office. 
(3)  Dotted line indicates the 50%  vote share; Bold line is the regression line: 
                                             % local vote   =     0.51     +    0.04  ×  % provincial vote 
                                                                          (57.23)***    (3.38)*** 
F(1,2034) = 20.55 (0.00); t-statistics in parenthesis; ***,** & *= statistically significant at the 99, 95 and 
90 % levels; standard errors clustered at the provincial level. N = 2034. 
